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The Outlook for Net Exports
For some time now, analysts have been predict-
ing an improvement in the u.s. trade balance.
But there has been little indication of a turn-
around so far, despite the 35 percent deprecia-
tion of the dollar since its peak in February
1985. In fact, net exports of goods and services
- total exports minus total imports ~ worsened
in the second quarter of 1986 to a deficit level of
around $150 billion in 1982 dollars (see Chart 1).
Alarmed by these developments, some forecast-
ers have begun to predict that a substantial
improvement in the trade balance is unlikely in
the near future. If predictions of little or no
improvement turn out to be correct, significant
problems could lie ahead. For instance, most
forecasts of an acceleration in economic growth
over the next year depend heavilyon an
improvement in the net export sector. Without
that improvement, real output may continue to
be sluggish. Also, there is the strong possibility
that a continuing high trade deficit will further
increase election year pressures for protectionist
legislation. If enacted, this legislation would not
only raise consumer costs but could also lead to
retaliatory actions by other nations that would
close markets to u.s. exporters.
A number of reasons have been proposed for the
apparent lag in the anticipated turnaround in the
current u.s. trade picture. These include the
possibility that foreign exporters, having bene-
fited from high profits when the dollar was
strong, are now choosing to limit price increases
and to sacrifice their profit margins on exports to
the u.s. in order to preserve their share ofthe
huge u.s. market.
Another reason is that the dollar has not
changed much in value against the currencies of
some of our key trading partners, such as
Singapore, Canada, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
South Korea. Thus, imports from these countries,
which account for a substantial share oftotal
u.S. imports, are not likely to decrease. In addi-
tion, U.s. exports to countries whose currencies
have risen againstthe dollar are likely to be lim-
ited by continued competition from the afore-
mentioned countries. These developments
undoubtedly have had some effect on the trade
balance, although it is by no means clear how
important they have been.
How much of an improvement in the trade bal-
ance shouldwe have expected by now? To
answer this question, we used estimates ofthe
historical relationship between the trade balance
and its traditional determinants - the exchange
rate and u.s. and world GNP - to determine
what the trade balance would be now ifhistor-
ical relationships had continued to hold. Ifthe
recent developments discussed above have
changed historical relationships significantly,
then there should be big differences between the
actual trade balance and what these relation-
ships predict. Conversely, small differences
would suggest that the current trade balance is
not out of line with past experience.
Net exports and the dollar
In the past year-and-a-half, the dollar has fallen
thirty-five percent on a trade-weighted basis.
When the value of a country's currency falls, all
other things considered, the country's exports
become cheaper and easier to sell. At the same
time, imports into that country become more
expensive and harder to sell.
Other factors can influence the trade balance as
well. Exports depend on the level of income and
economic activity abroad, while imports depend
on domestic income. A large part ofthe u.s.
trade deficit that emerged after 1982 was due to
faster growth in the United States than abroad as
well as to the rise in the value of the dollar.
Of course, it takes time for changes in currency
values to affect trade flows because it takes time
for buyers to recognize changes in the relative
prices of goods. In addition, buyers may not be
able to adjust the quantities to which pre-exist-
ing contracts had committed them in the short-
run. It also takes time to form new business con-
nections and to place new orders. Even if buyers
could be found rapidly, contracting for new
equipment and raw materials, building capacity,FRBSF
and so on to increase production could also
require a substantial amount oftime.
The critical question for the present trade bal-
ance situation is whether enough time has
elapsed since the dollar began falling for us to
expect the trade balance to show some improve-
ment. To answer this question, we use two dif-
ferent approaches for estimating the historical
relationship between the trade balance and its
determinants.
Results from two statistical techniques
The first approach, known as structural estima-
tion, uses economic theory to specify separate
relationships for real exports of goods and ser-
vices and real imports of non-oil goods and ser-
vices. Petroleum imports were removed because
ofthe changeability of OPEC pricing practices
and the relative unresponsiveness of oil imports
to changes in U.S. dollar exchange rates
(because oil generally is invoiced in dollars).
We obtained statistical estimates of these rela-
tionships using data from the fourth quarter of
1972 to the second quarter of 1983 (when the
u.s. net export deficit first emerged). Consistent
with economic theory, we found that exports
increased withincreases in the rest of the
world's real GNP and fellwith increases in the
real value of the dollar. Our results indicate that
the effect ofthe real value ofthe dollar on ex-
ports generally took three quarters to emerge
and peaked after six quarters. Non-oil imports
were found to rise with increases in U.s. real
GNP and increases in the real value ofthe dol-
lar. The effect ofthe exchange rate on imports
was found to peak after three quarters and to last
for a total offour quarters.
(One mightargue that goods flows and service
flowsshould be explained separately. For
instance,the investment income component of
services is more sensitive to factors such as inter-
est rates. However, statistical estimates for goods
flows alone were actually worse than the esti-
mates for goods and services discussed here. In
addition, quarterly variations in overall net
exports are more a reflection of variations in
goods flows. Consequently, we did not consider
it necessaryto consider the role of variables
such as interest rates.)
Next,weused the estimated relationships to pre-
dict actual import and export levels over the
period 1983Q3-1986Q2 (which is outside the
period from which data was drawn to estimate
the relationships). The predictions tracked the
actual import and export levels reasonably well
through 1985. However, actual imports were
underpredicted in each ofthe last three quarters,
with the largest error occurring in the most
recent quarter,1986Q2.
Chart 2 plots the predicted and actual values of
net exports obtained from this exercise (actual
oil imports were included to make total imports
and exports comparable). Observe that, based
on past experience, we would have predicted a
continuing deterioration of U.S net exports
through the first quarter of 1986 despite the ear-
lier depreciation of the dollar. This suggests that
the failure of the trade balance to improve
through the beginning of this year is consistent
with normal lags between changes in currency
value (and foreign and domestic economic
growth) and net exports. However, past experi-
ence also would have led us to predict an
improvement in the second quarter ofthis year
that did not take place. For that quarter, the pre-
diction error is significantly larger than the errors
for earlier periods shown in the chart.
The second approach used to analyze net ex-
ports is a statistical technique known as Vector
Autoregression (VAR). In contrast to the struc-
tural approach, this technique lets the data
speak for itself in the sense that it imposes no
theory on how different variables should interact
with one another. The VAR model we con-
structed included, in addition to the real values
ofexports and imports ofgoods and services,
U.s. real GNP, world real GNP, the nominal
value of the dollar, the u.s. consumption defla-
tor, and an index offoreign consumer prices.
The VAR technique was used to estimate the
relationships between these variables using data
from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quar-
ter of 1983. We then used the estimated rela-
tionships to predict exports and imports from the
third quarter of 1983 to the second quarter of
1986. The errors that this technique made in
predicting imports are smaller than those made
by the structural approach.
Chart 3 plots the corresponding predictions for
net exports from the VAR approach. As with the
structural approach, this technique predicted a
deterioration in u.s. net exports through the first1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
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quarter of 1986. It also predicted an improve-
ment in net exports in the second quarter of
1986, although the predicted improvement
shown in Chart 3 is noticeably smaller than that
from the structural approach shown in Chart 2.
actually occurred. Recently reieased preliminary
data for July indicate deterioration through that
month and suggest that a significant improve-
ment in the trade balance may not occur even in
the third quarter of this year.
Conclusions
Because the predictions of both approaches fit
the data reasonably well through the first quarter
of 1986, the continued deterioration in net ex-
ports until then was probably consistent with
past experience. In particular, factors such as
unusual pricing behavior by foreign exporters or
the fact that the u.s. dollar has not declined
much in value against the currencies of some
key trading partners may not have played much
of a role in stalling any improvement in the trade
balance.
Both approaches did predict a turnaround in the
trade balance during the second quarter of
1986, in contrast to the further deterioration that
However, it is worth pointing outthat data for
the second quarter, as well as July, is ba.sed on
incomplete information and therefore subject to
substantial revision. Moreover, missing aturning
point by one or two quarters is not a rare occur-
rence in forecasting economicvariables.
But the failure of net exports to improveby the
end ofthis year would imply that historical rela-
tionships have changed. Such an outcome
would indicate that one or more ofthe factors
mentioned at the start ofthis Letter is exerting a
significant influence on the trade balance.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,197 1,787 6,019 3.0
Loans and Leases1 6 183,889 1,654 6,010 3.3
Commercial and Industrial 50,827 147 - 919 - 1.7
Real estate 67,265 - 29 2,883 4.4
Loans to Individuals 39,529 - 93 2,071 5.5
Leases 5,524 °
99 1.8
U. S. Treasury and AgencySecurities2 11,408 34 - 763 - 6.2
Other Securities2 7,901 100 772 10.8
Total Deposits 210,966 5,887 7,129 3.4
Demand Deposits 56,177 4,821 4,524 8.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,335 1,641 - 10,911 -23.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 17,760 1,046 3,266 22.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,029 20 - 660 - 0.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 47,276 301 1,813 3.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 34,576 - 384 - 3,396 - 8.9
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 25,070 816 914 3.7
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change